View: India’s foreign policy paradoxes

By Sadanand Dhume

Can the government convince Indians that its foreign policy is on track even as India’s image takes an unprecedented beating worldwide? Former National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon’s uncharacteristically blunt description last week of the controversial Citizenship Amendment Act as a “self-inflicted goal” raises this intriguing question. Can a selfinflicted goal abroad nonetheless be hailed at home?

On the face of it, Menon’s assessment is blindingly obvious. No matter how popular the new law may be among BJP supporters, there’s no denying that its foreign policy impact for India has been negative.

At one stroke, the Modi government has dented India’s reputation for treating people of all faiths equally, embarrassed friends in Bangladesh and Afghanistan, riled important members of the US Congress, and generated an avalanche of criticism in the global press. Some of this criticism may be overstated or fuzzy on the details of the law. But this does not change the fact that both the law itself, and the heavy-handed response to protests in Delhi and Uttar Pradesh, have damaged India’s reputation and standing.

A thoughtful government would have taken criticisms on board and crafted a law that showed compassion for Hindus and Sikhs stranded in hostile territory by an accident of history, without either undermining the constitutional principle of secularism or making a crude show of shunning Muslims for their faith. Instead the Modi administration allowed prejudice to trump prudence.

How much will any of this matter to the average Indian? If the past is precedent, not much. In my conversations with voters in Uttar Pradesh ahead of last year’s general elections one theme came up consistently: they were grateful to Narendra Modi for elevating India’s image on the global stage. As more than one person put it: “Bharat ka naam roshan kar diya.” (He made India’s name shine.) This was when a slew of prominent international publications – including The Economist and Time – had cautioned their readers about the prospects of a second term for the PM.

At one level this hardly qualifies as an insight. Even in the industrialised Western democracies the elite media lacks the power to decisively shape political opinion. If it were otherwise, Hillary Clinton would be the US president and Boris Johnson would be banging out newspaper columns instead of running Britain. In India, the gap between media elites and the masses is arguably even wider than in the West. In terms of electoral relevance, the foreign media may as well be from Mars.

Mass obliviousness to global media criticism is only one advantage that the prime minister enjoys in shaping domestic perceptions of his foreign policy. He also benefits from the simple fact that India’s stature in the world genuinely has risen considerably since it embarked upon economic reforms in 1991.

For all its troubles, a nation of 1.3 billion people with the world’s fifth largest economy cannot be ignored. India’s membership of such fora as the G-20 and Brics ensures a steady stream of photo ops with the world’s most prominent leaders. A large potential market ensures a steady supply of global corporate chieftains willing to flatter whoever happens to be in charge. This would be true even if India was led by Mamata Banerjee or Akhilesh Yadav. Prime Minister Narendra Modi just happens to do a better job than most politicians of leveraging his office for photo ops.

Add to this the cult-like devotion that Modi evokes. Many supporters are simply impervious to evidence of problems. If foreigners praise Modi it’s proof that he’s leading India to greatness. If foreigners criticise Modi, it’s proof that they’re jealous that he’s leading India to greatness. You can call this the demonetisation theory of populist politics. There’s no such thing as a bad decision because for the true believer the pain caused by even the worst policy is merely proof of certain gains just around the corner.

That the government moves that have attracted the most international censure – the crackdown in Jammu and Kashmir and the citizenship law – enjoy a large measure of popular support in India also helps the ruling party. Attacks on government policies can easily be portrayed as attacks on India itself. Western concerns about human rights can be swatted away as neo-imperialism.

Censure by international bodies such as the United Nations Commission on Human Rights can help rally people behind the flag. Virtually any criticism can be deflected by the great Indian talent for whataboutery. Why don’t they say this about X-stan or Y-land?

To be sure, this structural slant in favour of the government on foreign policy issues is hardly unique to India. Even in the most open democracies, by its nature foreign policy making tends to be more tightly controlled than domestic policy. This gives a small number of insiders a disproportionate sway over messaging. In many countries, reporters on the foreign policy beat tend to fall in line behind the official view. Officials wield a disproportionate ability to reward cheerleaders and punish dissenters.

This does not change the fact that Modi’s second term has opened with a set of colossal foreign policy blunders that – depending on how their fallout is managed – could saddle India’s diplomats with headaches for many years. But those who see this reality should not kid themselves about the odds of convincing their compatriots.

The writer is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC