How India should navigate the border standoff with China

Should the current Chinese intrusions into undisputed Indian territory be seen as a local and bilateral problem or as part of Beijing’s opportunism and exertions all around to show it’s not Covid-damaged but, in fact, Covid-enabled?
Describing what’s going on or what triggered the multiple incursions or how to read them is hotly disputed territory. It’s where an incursion goes by every other name and the delicacy of description is an art.

Then the important question: Is it better for India to have vocal support from other countries? Or does it complicate matters for New Delhi as it tries to restore “peace and tranquility” – itself a very “win-win” formulation from the lexicon deployed for Sino-Indian matters.

So far, five meetings have reportedly been held between local commanders with little progress on restoring the status quo. Hundreds of Chinese soldiers are said to be 3 to 4 kilomteres into India’s side of the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh’s Galwan Valley with heavy vehicles. They are reportedly building bunkers.

It’s more than patrolling mischief. Three incursions in Ladakh and Sikkim within a span of a month are alarming even considering the usual explanations: differing perception of the LAC, summertime grabs by China as the snow melts, Chinese overreaction to any infrastructure improvement by India among others.

Good news is that both sides are keeping their statements relatively mellow and Chinese state organs are not doing the “needful” creating patently racist memes as they did during the Doklam crisis. At least not yet.

No surprise then that comments from Alice Wells, the State Department’s top South Asia official, created a bit of a stir. When asked about the tense border situation during her farewell press conference last week, she connected the Chinese incursions to Beijing’s “provocations and disturbing behaviour” in South China Sea and elsewhere.

The intrusions show that Chinese aggression is not always “just rhetorical.” At a later interaction with The Atlantic Council, Wells dived deeper and reiterated for good measure that the US recognized the McMahon Line and Arunachal Pradesh as an Indian state while urging the two sides to engage diplomatically.

Thanks, but no thanks, New Delhi clapped back and let it be known that it prefers to find its own solution despite close relations with Washington. India clearly doesn’t want to be drawn into a united front with other countries currently having serious problems with China. But another well-respected reporter said “this time India will not be unhappy if the US openly takes up cudgels on its behalf” although it could complicate things. Perhaps, New Delhi is multi- messaging.

Here’s the thing -- what Wells said was careful and needed to be said. But I will let the experts explain. Ashley J. Tellis, the foremost US expert on South Asia told me, “What she did was correct – she laid down the baseline for how the US judges these events, not just in India’s case.” The reason: “China’s standard operating procedure is to claim that every single issue in which it is implicated is unique and there are specific provocations to which it is responding. She deflated that argument.”

The Donald Trump Administration is unlikely to say more unless the situation spirals. During the Doklam crisis, the US largely kept quiet at India’s urging save two routine expressions of concern by the State and Defence Department spokespersons.

India doesn’t want the boundary issue to become a “geo-political football” and get caught up in US-China competition, according to Tanvi Madan of Brookings. A public US intervention can be seen as American mischief by China.

Rajesh Rajagopalan, professor of international politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, had a different view. “Beijing cannot constantly dictate who India’s friends should be, nor should New Delhi be walking on eggshells, considering China’s actions on the LAC are a lot more harmful to (India-China) relations than Ambassador Wells’ words,” he told me.

Besides, the Chinese react strongly to anything the US says, especially in their “wolf warrior” avatar. True to form, a Chinese spokesman called Wells’ comments “nonsense.” The US-China ideological divide has sharpened and almost anything a third country does with either will be seen as adversarial by the other, according to Jabin T. Jacob, one of India’s top China experts and associate professor at Shiv Nadar University.

But countries like India cannot be “too sensitive to this, else we will get nothing done,” he told me. Jacob firmly believes the events in Ladakh should be seen “as an entirely localized issue and will be resolved eventually on local give-and-take.”

The big question: who will give, where and how much?

Views expressed are author's own