Is The UN Shipping Agency, The IMO, Still Fit For Purpose?

The embattled UN agency responsible for regulating global shipping was in the headlines again last week.  This time for facilitating an agreement that broke the Paris Agreement on Climate Change with emissions from shipping that actually increased rather than decreased by 2030.

This comes as hundreds of thousands of seafarers put their lives at risk for the owners of large shipping companies, bypassing safety laws that the IMO does not enforce.  Shareholders of large shipping companies have seen their stock prices rebound 85% since the coronavirus lockdown, generating over $23 billion of additional shareholder value.  The UN Secretary General has called this a ‘humanitarian crisis,’ and even the Pope has had to intervene in the global shipping industry.

The root cause is a crisis of leadership.  Both individually, and how the IMO has defined its mandate.

Serious failings in IMO’s response to Mauritius oil spill

This takes us back to the events of August to see how badly off the IMO was with the Wakashio oil spill in Mauritius.  Today marks 100 days since the initial grounding of the large, Japanese vessel, the Wakashio, whose stern is still on Mauritius’ coast, grinding away at the coral reefs with such a devastating impact that the destroyed coral sediments can be seen from space (including now on Google Earth).

The IMO’s response to the oil spill in Mauritius will forever be synonymous with the phrase, “oil is just like skin cream,” that its representative incredulously said on national TV to the Mauritian population.  He did this as he rubbed the spilled oil onto his palms, prompting an emergency response from the UN’s World Health Organization to counter this statement, that explained the cancer-causing risks of oil to those who have been exposed.

It now turns out that critical pieces of evidence from the Wakashio oil spill in Mauritius are starting to go missing.  This is in violation of the IMO’s own laws.  Yet the IMO has remained silent. Just two examples start to show how serious these violations are.

Wakashio’s Black Box (VDR)

On October 7, the Mauritian Police revealed that the ‘black box’ of the Wakashio (the Voyage Data Recorder) had no voice audio recording from the bridge.

This is a serious violation of an important international law governed by the UN’s International Maritime Organization: Chapter V of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), regulation 20.  

Not having a fully functioning Voyage Data Recorder is as serious an offense as you can get in shipping, as this is a critical safety feature to uncover the root causes of incidents like the Wakashio.

Yet, the IMO has remained silent, as thousands of Mauritians continue to demand answers and protest on the streets of Mauritius for truth and justice.  This includes the families of four Mauritian tugboat crew whose lives were lost as part of the Wakashio salvage operation.

Missing fingerprinting of the oil

Since the start of the oil spill, there has not been any fingerprinting conducted of the oil spilled.  This is a critical step to characterize the nature of the hazard of the oil, and was particularly relevant for the Wakashio, especially given that  the IMO had already admitted on August 19 that  they did not know the impact of this oil in Mauritian waters.

It is inconceivable for how any oil spill response could be planned without doing this most basic step.  It is the equivalent of a doctor performing surgery on a patient without assessing the blood type.

With the death of over 50 dolphins and whales, thousands of sea-creatures weeks later, harmful algae bloom appearing in Mauritius’ protected Blue Bay Marine Park, and fish having traces of cancer causing PAH-chemicals from the oil spill in over 125 kilometers square of Mauritius’ lagoon, this was not a small oversight.  Understanding the nature of the oil was fundamental to its response.

The IMO had rushed in at the start of the oil spill crisis, and elbowed out any attempt from other nations and international organizations to help (offers of scientific and technical assistance had poured in from the USA, France, UK, Australia, Canada among others).  Those who were allowed in, such as the Government of Japan, were not a neutral party to the incident given the involvement of one of their biggest shipping companies and only maritime insurance agency, the Japan P&I Club.

Other organizations such as London-based ITOPF were sent in to respond to the Mauritius oil spill (at the request of the vessel insurer, Japan P&I Club).  These organizations even have detailed guidelines on how to perform this oil fingerprinting (their document called TIP14 is available online). Yet, the ITOPF does not appear to have conducted any of the rigorous oil fingerprinting process that they espouse in their own documentation, making one wonder what the impact was of their presence in Mauritius 100 days later.

The  ITOPF have not responded to a request for comment, or any international media question.  Again, more questions being raised about the transparency and accountability of these international organizations who were supposedly sent into Mauritius to ‘help’ local efforts.

What resulted was something that appears more than just a botched response.  It cannot be coincidence for an oil spill response to have gone this badly wrong by accident, especially during such a high profile grounding and oil spill leak that many other countries had publicly responded to.

At the forefront of the response was the IMO whose representative positioned themselves as the lead UN coordinating agency for the oil spill response. Yet they take no responsibility for any liability or additional harm that may have now been caused by their involvement.

Silence from IMO’s senior leadership

There has not been a senior level response from the IMO to the Wakashio oil spill for over 100 days, despite Mauritius still being in a state of National Environmental Emergency since then.  

Neither has there been a detailed account of the IMO’s efforts from either the Secretary General of the IMO, Kitack Lim, or any of the senior leadership of the IMO who authorized the IMO representative’s Mission to Mauritius and oversaw the IMO’s work in the country. At the very least, a response to the IMO representative’s public comment that ‘ship oil is like skin cream’ would have merited an investigation and public response by the IMO’s own Head of Internal Oversight and Ethics, especially considering the World Health Organization had to whilst they were fighting a global coronavirus pandemic.

A statement from the IMO on September 23 said, “The IMO Secretariat is also supporting the [Wakashio oil spill] response, by providing backstopping to the IMO expert in the field at the time of his deployment, and has been maintaining close liaison with the affected country, the flag State and technical partners throughout in order to provide support and assistance, as required.”

The only statement from the IMO Secretary, General Kitack Lim, was a five line statement put up on the website on 16 September (seven and a half weeks after the grounding and state of environmental emergency called in Mauritius). It read:

“I would like to express my sympathies to the delegation of Mauritius for the oil spill affecting them, following the break-up of the MV Wakashio. We will continue to provide the necessary assistance and I commend all those involved in the international efforts to support the Government of Mauritius to mitigate the negative impact. I look forward to a full investigation into these incidents so that the results and findings can be brought to IMO and we can act on any recommendations accordingly.”

It is almost as if the senior leadership of the IMO have remained hidden away (yes, hidden) for 100 days, afraid of journalist questions, rather than being transparent with the truth and their activities on the ground in Mauritius.  This is hardly an institution that merits the trust of the world to opt out of the Paris Agreement, set out its own agreement in 2018 under pressure from NGOs, and then default on this again just last week.

The last time the leadership of an organization had been so absent from a major oil spill, was BP CEO Tony Hayward following the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill a decade ago.  We all know what happened to that leadership approach.

If there is nothing to hide, why has IMO leadership avoided media scrutiny and questions that have been asked of it at every stage?

International shipping has become riskier

As shipping has become larger and riskier (as permitted by the IMO), fewer of these vessels can pass through the Suez Canal, and so more and more large ships travel close to the Indian Ocean islands of Mauritius and Reunion islands.  

Rather than making the global shipping industry cover this additional risk that is needed, it has fallen on small island nations like the Mauritian taxpayers to subsidize the multi-billion dollar global shipping industry with oil protection equipment.

International laws violated

With the Wakashio, it appears at least seven international laws from the IMO were broken with the environment alone, let alone violations of safety at sea laws (such as a Voyage Data Recorder that doesn’t appear to have been working).  

Of the environmental laws broken, these include:

1. Violations of Marpol Annex 1

2. Violations of Marpol Annex 6

3. Violations of the International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships' Ballast Water and Sediments (BWM Convention)

4. Violations of International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling Systems in Ships (AFS Convention)

5. Violations of The Hong Kong International Convention for the safe and environmentally sound recycling of ships (Hong Kong Convention)

6. Violations of Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks (Nairobi Wreck Removal Convention)

7. Violations of The Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS)

IMO: an $80 million a year ‘talking shop’

In response, a spokesperson for the IMO said on October 19, that “The IMO does not enforce regulations.”

So if the IMO is a UN agency that does not monitor or enforce its own regulations, then it is just a talking shop.

It has a role that could be replaced by any NGO like the Aspen Institute, the UN Global Compact,  World Economic Forum, or even TED.  Is there a reason why $80 million of taxpayers money is spent on this UN Agency each year? For a $80 million taxpayer handout a year, there are likely to be many other organizations who would be a lot more effective than the IMO in facilitating agreements toward new shipping and sustainability legislation.

In the same response, the IMO’s spokesperson goes on to say that “IMO has not been given a role to monitor and enforce Marpol [Shipping Pollution Laws] or the Ballast Water Management Convention.”

This shows a fundamental misunderstanding of how global governance operates. Data is power, and by not putting in place the right data collection protocols, the IMO is deliberately undermining global environmental and ship safety standards.  The IMO has not collected the right data in which to make informed decisions, and instead pleads ignorance to knowing what is happening in the maritime sector.  This is basic leadership oversight - what you measure is what will change.

Either the organization or the leadership are not fit for purpose.  Perhaps both.

Angry former Presidents calling for IMO transparency

Former Presidents of Mauritius (non-political roles, similar to the Queen of England to protect the Constitution, with day to day Government affairs being run by a Prime Minister), have called for greater transparency on the conduct of the IMO in Mauritius.  Dr Ameenah Gurib-Fakim is a world leading biodiversity scientist and former President of Mauritius.  She was Mauritius’ lead representative as a Head of State addressing the 2015 Climate Negotiations in Paris that led to the landmark climate deal.  

On October 26, Dr Gurib-Fakim said, “Today marks two months since dead dolphins and whales started washing up on our shores near Blue Bay, not far from the Wakashio wreck. Two months since part of the Wakashio had been sunk in an undisclosed site under the watch of the Governments of Mauritius, France, Japan and the IMO. As a Nation, we are still in the dark to basic critical questions.” 

This follows similar calls on the BBC a month ago, calling for transparency and accountability from the IMO about its role in Mauritius. In an interview on BBC News on September 17, she said, “Mauritius is still in a State of National Environmental Emergency.  Information should be shared for the public record.  We are angry and demand transparency from the international organizations like the IMO operating in our country. There has still not been a joint press conference with all international organizations operating in Mauritius, and we have been left totally in the dark.  This is utterly unacceptable.”

It is extraordinary that an international United Nations Agency could be ignoring such calls, not meeting with all critical stakeholders in Mauritius, all the while getting fundamental oil spill response steps wrong.

Indeed, the IMO did not meet any of the opposition parties, Leader of the Opposition (a respected former Minister of Foreign Affairs) or any of the leading independent scientists when in Mauritius.  This was whilst knowing there were hundreds of thousands protesting in the streets against what has been largely seen as an authoritarian Government ever since widespread allegations of electoral fraud emerged at the November 2019 General Elections, which are still being contested in the Mauritian Courts.

Defund the IMO?

The IMO is a $80 million a year organization that is 74% funded by taxpayers from around the world.

If it is not leading to a cleaner or safer global shipping industry, what is taxpayers money going toward?

Perhaps there needs to be a ‘Defund the IMO campaign’ until the IMO starts to act on behalf of it’s true Board - those that pay its bills - taxpayers around the world.

How badly wrong the IMO got things in Mauritius

To show how badly wrong the IMO was in Mauritius, several investigators with experience in major oil spills around the world, such as Rick Dawson who has worked on some of the US’ biggest oil spill responses for the US Department of Interior, were asked what they would have expected in the first 10 days of a major oil spill.

The IMO positioned itself as the lead UN agency for the oil spill response under an oil spill response agreement called OPRC(95), sending an ‘oil spill expert’ to Mauritius.  This is the work that they should have done, supported by expertise from across the IMO and beyond.

Instead, the response of the IMO in Mauritius can be characterized as relatively ‘fact free,’ and secretive.  It was a product of this ‘fact free’ approach that led to the disastrous outcomes of the response.

Here are the basic questions that the IMO had failed to undertake in the critical initial weeks of the oil spill.  With a well educated population, high cell phone penetration and new technologies in Mauritius, this fact base could even have been compiled within the first 48 hours. 

And yet, it is still not there 100 days on, and the IMO is quietly trying to evade its responsibilities and any form of accountability of its actions in Mauritius.

Basic questions to answer when addressing an oil spill  

A) Environmental Sensitivity Mapping and Delineation.

In particular, highlighting:

• Shoreline habitats and natural resources
• Lagoon habitats and natural resources
• Offshore habitats and natural resources
• Areas of special national concern (sanctuaries, parks, breeding grounds, historical sites of international importance).
• Tourist and public beaches
• Commercial and recreational fishing areas
• Ranking areas designated for bioprospecting (under government lease)
• Cultural Resources (such as UNESCO heritage sites, cultural sites such as spiritual places of worship, cemeteries, war graves etc)
• Historic Resources (such as location of important ship wrecks and coastal historic forts)

B) Knowledge of the Chemical properties of the fuel of the vessel

• Basic chemical formula of the fuel
• What is the previous history of cleanup with this type of fuel?
• Fate and Effects of the spilled fuel
• Fauna & flora toxicity
• Habitat recovery

What are the current “mass balance” estimates?

• Amount of fuel recovered by cleanup efforts versus the amount spilled
• Amount of fuel recovered by cleanup efforts versus the amount estimated in the fuel tanks at the beginning of the voyage and the average hourly fuel consumption rate?

Were measurements made of:

• The contribution to the pollution and the toxic effects to traditionally measured water quality parameters
• Acute and chronic toxicity to the habitats (flora and fauna) and resources commonly found in the environments in and around Mauritius, in particular:
• Corals
• Seagrass environments
• Mangroves
• Coral sand beaches
• Cobble beaches
• Commercial and recreationally valuable fisheries species and their life cycle components
• Lagoons
• Birds
• Marine mammals (e.g., whales and dolphins)

How many samples were taken of each media (i.e., habitat or natural resource)?

Were samples analyzed by certified laboratories? By who?

Where is the data being stored?

Is the data accessible to Mauritian authorities?

C) Decision matrix for the Application of Spill Counter Measures (Physical, Biological or Chemical)

This includes the use of high pressure hot fresh water sprays, and biological or low grade detergents, or use of chemicals. 

Such a decision matrix should be based on:

1. Efficacy of technique on the habitats/resources
2. Impact of the technique on the habitats/resource

• Ranking shoreline habitats/resources
• Ranking lagoon habitats/resources
• Ranking offshore habitats/resources
• Ranking Areas of special national concern (sanctuaries, parks, etc.
• Ranking tourist/public beaches
• Ranking commercial & recreational fishing areas
• Ranking areas designated for bioprospecting (under government lease)
• Ranking areas designated as areas of places of archeological, historic or architectural importance.

D) Decision-making related to Vessel Salvage

• Criteria for decision to tow vessel to deep water and cause “double spill”?
• Was the vessel lightened prior to towing?
• Where was the ballast water taken on?
• Was there a consideration of contamination of the sensitive environment of Mauritius factored into decisions regarding discharge of ballast water?
• Who is in possession of the ballast water log?

E) Knowledge of the Condition/crew of:

1. Vessel

• Could the vessel electronics suffered a cyber-attack (viruses) or software failure?
• The navigational system (both traditional and electronic, ECDIS)
• What is the explanation for the “lost four days” mid- voyage in the Indian Ocean by the vessel?

2. Captain

3. Crew

• Fitness - experience on that vessel
• Training - who provided the training, who provided the certification, how was the crew’s performance regularly evaluated against this certification to ensure they were suitably qualified for the equipment they were supposed to be using

F) Damage assessment from owner and P&I Club

• Does the Vessel Owner/P&I Club intend to fund or conduct any type of Damage Assessment that would form the basis of a claim for compensation for damages for losses to Mauritian businesses, fishermen and fund the restoration of natural and cultural resources and services lost or diminished by this incident?

G) This spill highlights a general failure of institutions to protect the resources, the economy and the general health and welfare of the Mauritian people.

• Was it a result of a lack of recognition of the significance of the spill and its impacts?
• Lack of preparedness by the government?
• Lack of preparedness by the IMO?
• Lack of preparedness by the Vessel owners / P& I Club insurers?

H) How does the IMO fix this in the future so that “good governance” practices prevail in the future to protect these valuable natural and cultural resources and the health and welfare of the people?

For example through a:

• Cooperative Agreement with the IMO?
• Cooperative Agreement with ITOPF similar to those in the United States between ITOPF and Department of Interior and US NOAA?
• Training, equipment and planning for spills on Mauritius by government agencies?

A rogue UN agency out of control?

The United Nations Secretary General, Antonio Gutteres has had to make a series of interventions into global shipping this summer.  Three times for the welfare of  seafarers, and again for an oil supertanker off the coast of Yemen about to disintegrate, risking 1 million barrels of oil leaking into the coastlines of 6 countries where 150 million people reside.

The IMO does not appear to be an international regulator in control of the companies, nations or organizations it is supposed to be setting standards for.  Indeed, 30 countries almost walked out of last Friday’s climate negotiations.

Perhaps it is time for a new approach to global governance of the oceans - one that does not include the IMO in its current configuration.

More regional based shipping organizations would create the safer, cleaner, more accountable shipping governance framework that is needed and more appropriate for the next decade, which will bring in some of the biggest changes ever seen in global shipping.

It could well be that Kitack Lim ends up being the last Secretary General of the International Maritime Organization.

Either that, or this may be the last generation to enjoy a vibrant and healthy ocean.