One of the objectives over the last few years of China was to keep the ASEAN divided on issues related to its illegal claim in the South China Sea (SCS) and activities relating to changing the geographical features of the region, its militarisation, encroachment into the EEZs of neighbouring countries, coercion, use of force to sink boats of other countries and ensuring no progress on the finalisation of the Code of Conduct (CoC).

In the past, China had rejected discussions on the Chinese claim in the SCS arguing that the issue was bilateral one and therefore multilateral forum of Association of South East Nations (ASEAN) was not the appropriate platform for discussing the issue of disputes on the conflicting claims. At the same time, realising that a unified approach towards its claim could build a significant pressure on it, China indulged in the devious game of keeping this group divided.

Two glaring examples reveal the Chinese game plan in this context. First in 2012, the ASEAN was under the chair of Cambodia- a country which is under heavy debt of China and therefore could easily be manipulated by it. Under the coercive power of China, Cambodia did not allow a united statement criticising China from the chair to be issued.

Since then, in Chairman’s statements instead of joint approach, the terms like “some leaders” and “some ministers” were used instead of “leaders” and “ministers” to express concerns over the Chinese belligerent activities.

Second, in 2016, after the Philippines won the case in the PCA, a hefty financial aid was promised to the newly elected President Duterte, who decided not to pursue the case and accommodate with China. An important judgement based on UNCLOS was shelved.

However, since the last year some developments suggest that it would be very difficult for China to divide the ASEAN in the coming period. First, last year in June, after the gap of several years under the chair of Vietnam, a Joint Communique was issued pointing out that the 1982 UNCLOS should be the basis for determining maritime entitlements, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and legitimate interests over maritime zones and also laid emphasis on the "importance of non-militarisation and self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability, and avoid actions that may further complicate the situation." This indicated not only the growing commitment of ASEAN in the rule-based system for peace and stability and opposition to aggressive acts but also that a strong leadership like that of Vietnam can neutralise the Dragon’s attempts to divide it.

Second, in 2020 Vietnam approached the UNSC to implement the PCA Ruling of 2016 finding that the Chinese aggressiveness was continuing unabated. Vietnam was followed by Indonesia and Malaysia. Later the Philippines too expressed the support for its implementation. This strengthened Vietnam’s position as the leader of the group. Whether Vietnam is holding the chair or not, it remains the de-facto leader of ASEAN. Currently, Vietnam is also the non-Permanent Member of the UNSC and is being supported by external powers in this endeavour. Vietnam and India, which joined the UNSC this year as a non-Permanent Member, have discussed the issue of coordination at the UNSC.

Third, with the actualisation of Quad, a greater support to ASEAN would be available to counter the Chinese mischief. Quad like ASEAN views the entire Indo-Pacific as one geographical entity to be governed by international law and norms. The joint Statement extended “strong support for ASEAN’s unity and centrality as well as the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific”. The SCS is in the sharp focus of Quad and opposes coercion-a term used for the Chinese belligerence. Other powers are also supporting Quad and in the UNSC a greater support level is expected for the implementation of the PCA Ruling of 2016, which China rejected and thereby clearly revealing its duplicity. The Quad Summit is an inflection point in the narrative of the world order. Though the leaders have said it is not against any country, it is certainly against the activities, which are contrary to the international law. The Free, Open, and Inclusive Indo-Pacific is based on geo-political multilateralism with cooperation of all stakeholders and no hegemonic power. PM Modi called it ‘a force for global good and stability.’

Fourth, the Chinese economy would go downwards in the coming period. During the pandemic period, anti-China feelings have significantly increased and several manufacturing companies have either moved out or moving out. Besides, there are other issues which make China unattractive as a business centre like ever-changing legal environment, bureaucratic and administrative interference, lack of transparency, weak intellectual rights protection, ageing population, underdeveloped middle management and insufficient number of qualified workers etc. Its efforts to ensure enhanced consumption internally is unlikely to yield the desired results in view of great disparity of economic development between rural and urban areas. The BRI projects are facing severe financial crunch. The Chinese overseas investments into countries of the BRI were about US$47 billion in 2020, about 54% less than in 2019. This would dent the capability of China to use economic power for coercion.

Fifth, while Russia and China are together in opposing US, they have divergent interests. By no stretch of imagination, it can be said that Russia would like the Chinese hegemony in Asia. Russia follows its own independent policy. Russia had not agreed to the Chinese request to stop supply of weapons including S-400 missiles to India. China also does not consult Russia for its belligerent activities in the SCS. Till recently, Russia’s economic interests in the SCS were limited. However, in the coming period its interests are likely to grow significantly. Russia has developed close links with the South East Asian countries particularly with Vietnam. Russia has promised military supplies to Vietnam. Russian Rosneft, partners to Indian ONGC Videsh, has been exploring oil block in Vietnam’s EEZ.

It may also move to the Philippines’ EEZ. Russia has interest in keeping safe the proposed Vladivostok-Chennai Maritime Corridor (VCMC) that passes through the SCS. An MoU was signed in September 2019 during PM Modi’s visit to Vladivostok, formalizing plans to construct this corridor. Currently, India and Russia are connected via the Mumbai-St Petersburg shipping route, but the VCMC would cut that distance by half, saving significant economic costs. The recent Suez Canal crisis underline the importance of this route, which would be discussed during the President Putin’s forthcoming visit to India.

This has the potential not only to reset the Indo-Russian trade route but could adversely impact the prospects of the Chinese Silk Route. The increased economic interest in the SCS of Russia would not allow instability in the region.

Thus, the Chinese efforts to divide ASEAN would face several serious challenges, though China would continue to make attempts to divide the ASEAN countries using its debt diplomacy. Hence, the ASEAN countries should remain prepared to counter Dragon’s such sinister designs by ensuring their unity and coordinating their efforts with other powers.

There is now an institutionalised mechanism available to check the use of coercion. The current Chinese encroachment in the Philippines’ EEZ is aimed at testing the response from ASEAN in the backdrop of Quad Summit. ASEAN countries should aim for economy in which there is “less China”. They should also press for the implementation of the PCA Ruling through the UNSC. The members of the Quad, and several western countries too are keen for its implementation. This is the most opportune moment for pressing the UNSC on this issue.

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Views expressed above are the author's own.

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