This year, our planet bore the brunt of an unprecedented number of extreme events – from unstoppable forest fires and heatwaves to floods, and even bizarre phenomena like glacial breaks in ice peaks and fire clouds – where clouds spew lightning instead of rain. For the first time in recorded history, rains lashed snow-bound Greenland.

In our own backyard, the Himalayas crumbled and collapsed in massive slope failures and landslides like never before. It is also the year when the IPCC has declared a ‘Code Red’ for humanity. And now, inexplicably, the environment ministry has just cleared seven hydroelectric projects (HEPs) on the Ganga, all located in the fragile Himalayan valleys of Uttarakhand.

The trail leading to this unwarranted decision is literally a broken, haphazard, fiasco of the committee over the committee, until, it seems, the desired outcome was achieved. It is a convoluted path that leads from stopping the devastation caused by hydro projects, to scouring any means to reopen them.

It started in 2013 when after the extreme destruction wreaked by the Kedarnath floods, the Supreme Court taking suo moto cognisance of the situation, directed the ministry of environment, forest and climate change (MoEF&CC) to form a committee to ‘make a detailed study as to whether existing and under construction, HEPs have contributed to environmental degradation, if so, to what extent and also whether it has contributed to the present tragedy.’ Meanwhile, it also put 24 proposed HEPs on hold.

Not surprisingly, this body consisting of 17 experts, found that the worst damages had occurred in areas near the hydro projects and that such projects caused ‘irreversible damage to the environment. Their report was submitted in 2014. The MoEF&CC submitted to the court in May 2014 its unambiguous concurrence, ‘It is clear from the report submitted by the expert body which is inclusive of the findings of many researches/committees, that with the construction of hydro power the local ecology is certainly burdened. There are clear citings of irreversible damages of environment, in terms of loss of forests, degraded water quality, geological, social impacts and that they enhance landslide and other disasters.’

In August 2014, project proponents for six of the 24 projects intervened in the court asking for relief. They pleaded that their proposed HEPs should be permitted. Surprisingly, another four-member committee was formed to investigate this issue. They, too, concluded that the projects ‘in their present form may not be taken up as they have the potential of causing significant impacts on biodiversity, riverine system, wildlife and other fragile eco-systems…’

The outcome was not satisfactory, and obviously, there had been a change of heart within the MoEF&CC, for, in contradiction to their own earlier admission to damages inflicted by HEPs, they constituted another expert body (EB-2) to provide mitigation and design modification so that these six projects could commence. This 10-member body, constituted of an entirely new group of individuals, was chaired by a gentleman, Mr Das, who had earlier held the position of co-chairman, appraisal committee, which had cleared some of these very projects. The conflict of interest was overlooked – or perhaps deliberate.

Quite predictably, the six projects with some design modifications were cleared by the EB-2. The ministry of power and the government of Uttarakhand backed the MoEF in its green signal to these projects, but the ministry of Jal Shakti took a contradictory stand, and saved the day. It observed in its affidavit: ‘The region around these projects is located in the geologically unstable and seismically active area. Hence the impact of any disaster will have a devastating impact on the people, flora, and fauna and on the entire eco-system as a whole, which is uncalled and unwarranted for.’ Acknowledging the exploitation of the Ganga, it said, ‘For any river to maintain its ecological stability, it should not be interfered beyond a limit. Whereas at present, rivers like Bhagirathi have been hindered to an extent of 51% by the already existing HEPs.’

In June 2016, the Union of India requested the court for 3 months to arrive at a consensus on the problematic issue of HEPs on the Ganga. Thereafter, the Jal Shakti ministry suddenly shifted the goal post and stated in its letter dated January 24, 2019, that taking into account the EB-2 report which did not recommend cancellation of projects, seven projects that were under construction and had been under freeze since the matter was sub-judice should be restarted in view of the investments already made. These seven projects were different from the previous six HEPs that were only in the proposed stage. Now the focus shifted to restarting these under-construction projects and the MoEFF, MoP and the state government promptly gave their consent. Thus, a consensus on restarting these seven projects was reached, although the ministry of water resources still reiterated that it was ‘not in favour of the construction of any other hydroelectric project in Ganga basin of Uttarakhand.’ It thereby stressed that the previous six projects were still not approved by it.

In the midst of all this haggling, the PMO held an inter-ministerial meeting on February 25, 2019, in which representatives of MoP, MoEF, MoWR and chief secretary of Uttarakhand were present. It was decided that no new HEPs would be taken up and those on which work had not started (proposed) would be dropped. Further that all under-construction projects, where works done were less than 50%, would also be canceled. It also stated that Uttarakhand would receive due monetary compensation for such cancellations. Accordingly, as the minutes of this meeting reveal, a committee of two members was set up for an ‘on the spot’ assessment of these seven under-construction HEPs.

The MoEF&CC never informed the Supreme Court about this meeting or the critical national policy formulated in it. In fact, to date, the findings of the committee regarding works done, remain unknown. Further, the green signal of the MoEF on these seven projects itself is in contradiction to this national policy, since at least some of them stood to be canceled.

The Himalayan glaciers are retreating faster than the global average. Flooding, cloudbursts, glacial lake outbursts are all predicted to increase with climate change. Such disasters destroy everything in their path, and HEPs are no exception. In 2012, flooding in Assi Ganga river wiped out Assi Ganga HEPs 1&2. The 2013 floods severely damaged Phata-Byung, Singoli-Bhatwari, and Vishnuprayag HEPs. The cost of rebuilding the valley in the aftermath was reportedly 1.1 billion dollars. In 2021, a rock and ice avalanche entirely destroyed Rishi Ganga project and severely damaged Vishnugad-Tapovan HEP, leaving over 200 dead, and with estimated losses of Rs 1500 crore to the latter. Previously, due to terrain fragility, Vishnugad-Tapovan had already suffered recurring damages, escalating the initial cost of Rs 2900 crore to Rs 13,000 crore.

Of the seven projects that have just received the green signal, two lie under heaps of debris. It is unsound reasoning to argue that these projects must be completed simply due to the initial error of starting them. In fact, the court proceedings and the MoEF which started out on the solid basis of investigating the devastation caused by HEPs in 2013, must now answer how it finds itself today filing affidavit upon affidavit to reopen these projects. It must justify such an ill-considered decision in the face of the numerous reports and warnings about the threat to ecology and the exacerbation of disasters. It must be prepared for the increasing wrath of the citizen, who bears the final brunt, even as it sets off this code red for the Ganga-Himalayas.

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Views expressed above are the author's own.

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